Pak Army
Brian Cloughley’s book on the Pakistan Army is a welcome addition to the extremely limited number of books on the Pakistan Army.The fact that such a book was not written by a Pakistani soldier or a civilian scholar does not paint a very bright picture about the state of history writing,or to be more specific military history writing in Pakistan.Brian Cloughley has the singular advantage of having served for a relatively long period in Pakistan as a UN Official and as a military attache.In addition he is also a soldier and thus his perception of military affairs is different from a scholar who is a civilian and thus suffers from certain limitations which can only be overcome by extraordinary analytical ability and painstaking hard research.Brian Cloughley has made an honest attempt to present things as they are or as he percieved them to be with whatever facts he could lay hands to and the result is a relatively significant work on Pakistani military history with reference to on ground military performance of the Pakistan Army in three Indo Pak wars.On the whole Cloughley’s account is fairly balanced and the layman reader can form a fairly continuous picture of the progress of the Pakistan Army from 1947 to date.The initial history of the Pakistan Army however is given a broad brush treatment and the British Indian Colonial social and military legacy is totally ignored.This leaves the reader with an impression that the Pakistan Army was an entity created in 1947 and all that it did from 1947 onwards had little connection with the pre 1947 British Colonial policy and the military experience of the Indian Army in the two world wars.The 1947-48 Kashmir War where the Pakistan Army got its baptism of fire as the independent army of a sovereign country is hardly discussed.Thus important military controversies like the Operation Venus Controversy etc are not discussed at all.The conduct of Kashmir War by the Pakistani civilian leadership and and its resultant impact on the army’s perception of the civilian leadership is not discussed.The British recruitment policy and their irrational advocacy of the "Martial Races Theory" is not discussed at all.The impact of the conservative British military heritage on the intellectual development of the post 1947 Pakistani military leadership is totally ignored.The Ayub period has been given a relatively more detailed treatment and the conduct of 1965 war is reasonably detailed and the analysis of military operations is objective,critical and thought provoking.No serious effort is however made to explain why the Pakistan Army failed to achieve any decisive breakthrough despite having technically superior equipment as well as numerical superiority in tanks.The 1971 war which was more of a one sided show and a war in which Indian victory in the Eastern Theatre in words of Field Marshal Mankekshaw was a "foregone conclusion" keeping in view the overwhelming Indian numerical superiority1 ,has been discussed in much greater detail than 1965 war.This is a serious draw back since 1965 deserved more space because it had more lessons keeping in view the fact that both sides employed their strategic reserves.The post 1971 history of the army has been given a better treatment and enables the layman reader to understand many aspects of the present state of confrontation in the Sub Continent.There are many factual and analytical errors in the book which were entirely avoidable and were not beyond the author or the publishers control.The publisher shares a major responsibility in ensuring accuracy of facts while analytical errors or analytical drawbacks are more within an authors sphere of responsibility.15 Lancers was not raised in 1948-50 but in 19552.Iskandar Mirza was not from the ICS (Indian Civil Service) but the Indian Political Service3.The author has asserted that Ayub Khan was "gallant in combat" 4but there is no record of it in terms of gallantry awards or mention in despatches.On the contrary Ayub was accused of tactical timidity in Burma5.Akhnur has been mentioned as the only road link to Kashmir6 whereas Akhnur ,as a matter of fact was the only road link to Poonch Valley only.The Indian 50 Para Brigade was not moved on 7th September to relieve the 54 Brigade as asserted on page-87 but made its appearance in the 15 Division area only on 10th September and that too in the Hudiara Drain area7.On page-96 the author states that 13 Dogra in 4 Indian Mountain Division area captured Bedian but was driven out by 7 Punjab’s counter attack the next day.In reality 13 Dogra never attacked Bedian ,nor was Bedian defended by 7 Punjab.Bedian was defended by 7 Baluch and attacked by 17 Rajput.Further Bedian was not attacked by a unit from the 4 Mountain Division but by a unit of 7 Indian Division which failed to capture it in the first place8.Jassar was not defended by a Pakistani Tank Troop as written on page-110 but by the whole 33 Tank Delivery Unit9.The Jassar operation did not result in release of a whole Indian tank regiment but release of two infantry battalions and a squadron minus10.4 FF was not part of 6 Armoured Division as stated on page-117.The whole "Order of Battle" of the Pakistan Army on the Western Front as given on page-225 is incorrect.Formations of the I Corps have thus been shown as formations of 11 Corps and vice versa.8 Armoured Brigade which was a part of 1 Corps has been shown as part of 4 Corps.Rahimuddin Khan has been promoted to Zia’s son in law on page-275 whereas Ejaz ul Haq was Rahim’s son in law. Aziz Ahmad the famous civil servant has been described as Aziz Ali9a.The order of battle of the Pakistan Army on page-284 has also some factual errors;eg Pakistan Army does not have any mechanised infantry divisions whereas the author has shown two divisions as mechanised divisions.One tank unit allotted to Pakistan in 1947 ie the 19 Lancers has not been listed at all in the list of armoured units allotted to Pakistan10.
The author rightly wonders why some military commanders guilty of timidity in Khem Karan were not immediately sacked!But he fails to mention that one of them was promoted to the rank of major general few years after the war.His analysis of the Khem Karan operations is considerably thought provoking.But the major reason for failure of the Khem Karan offensive ie poor initial planning which led to traffic congestion and poor engineers effort and delayed the concentration of the Pakistani 1st Armoured Division has not been discussed at all.The author however rightly points out that failure to carry out thorough reconnaissance was one of the major reasons of failure of the Pakistani armoured thrusts failure in Khem Karan.However his assertion that the Indians had considerable reserves to contain Pakistan Army even if it had achieved a breakthrough is not based on material facts.India did have its 23 Mountain Division,but this formation was nowhere near Khem Karan when the Pakistani offensive was launched.In any case a Mountain Infantry division could have been of little value against the Pakistani 1 Armoured Division.The analysis of the tank battles in Sialkot is not comprehensive and lacks depth.The authors assertion on page-120 that the ad hoc force under direct command of the I Pakistani Corps forced the Indians back to the border is not correct11.The 24 Brigade which did so was a part of the 15 Division and 25 Cavalry the tank unit which in the words of Indians stopped them acted on orders of its commanding officer alone and 1 Corps Headquarter had little idea of what 25 Cavalry did in stopping the Indians till the evening of 8th September.The author has not mentioned 25 Cavalry at all which in words of the Indian Armoured Corps’s historian; was the unit whose " performance was certainly creditable because it alone stood between the Indian 1st Armoured Division and its objective,the MRL Canal 11a" and stopped the 1st Indian Armoured Division on 8th September,all by itself.The authors reproduction of the Indian writer Verghese’s views that the Indian 1st Armoured Division dashed forward rashly is not based on facts.The Indian advance was fairly balanced and it was halted on 8th September not because the Indians had completely committed their armour but because the Commander 1st Armoured Brigade lost his nerve because of false and unsubstantiated reports of his flanks being under counter attack at a time when both the advancing Indian tank regiments had committed a total of only three squadrons with three squadrons uncommitted and the Indian 1st Armoured Division had a third tank regiment totally fresh and in a position to easily outflank the Pakistani armour in Gadgor area12.The author has also not discussed at all the Indian armours total lack of activity on 9th and 10th September.This inactivity at a time when there was just one tank regiment to oppose five Indian tank regiments was the main reason for the Indian main attack’s failure in Sialkot Sector.The treatment of the 1971 war is far more detailed than 1965 war.All the emphasis is however on the Eastern Theatre where the Indian victory in words of the Indian Chief was a foregone conclusion.The author has highlighted actions of bravery at small unit level and has shown that the Pakistan Army put up a good show in East Pakistan as far as the junior leadership was concerned.The battles on the Western Theatre have however been largely ignored and the battle of Chhamb which was described by the Indians as "the most serious reverse suffered in the 1971 war 13" has not been discussed in much detail.Major General Eftikhar was the finest commander at the operational level as far as the Pakistan Army is conerned and any history of Pakistan Army is incomplete without discussing Eftikhar’s brilliant opearational leadership in Chhamb.Eftikhar was one of the only two Pakistani senior commanders praised by the Indian military historians.One Indian military historian described him as one who "showed skill and determination in carrying out his mission" .14
The analysis of the Bhutto period is quite comprehensive and the personality of Mr Bhutto and his attitude towards the army has been described quite correctly.The sycophantic persoanlity of Zia has however been given a generous treatment and many of Zia’s well known antics to please Mr Bhutto like orders to all officers of Multan Garrison to line up their wives to greet Mr Bhutto’s cavalcade passing through the Fort Colony have not been discussed at all.The intelligence and operational failure in Siachen on part of the ISI and the formation responsible for the defence of Siachen as a result of which the Indians were able to infiltrate 35 miles inside Pakistani territory have not been discussed at all.On the contary General Pirdad who was the formation commander during the Siachen debacle has been praised as an admirable officer15.The authors assertion that English language was neglected during the Zia era is not based on facts.I was a cadet in Zia’s tenure at the Pakistan Military Academy.Any cadet who failed in English was not promoted to the next term and English teaching and examination standards were very tough.The crux of the problem was the overall deteriorating English standards in Pakistan following Bhuttos nationalisation of educational institutuins and the relatively poor material joining the army in the post 1971 era.The post Zia era has been covered in a very incisive manner.The authors assertion that the "Director infantry" was a post that any infantry officerw ould welcome is incorrect.Mahor General Zahir Ul Islam Abbasi was posted as Director Infantry following a diasastorous Charge of the light Brigade type attack in Siachen which he had ordered without prior approval of his next senior operational headquarter. in which one of the Pakistani units suffered unnecesarily high casualties including the death of a brigade commander.The authors criticism of the ISI is forthright,accurate and thought provoking.In this regard he has shown courage in criticising a top heavy agency whose much trumpeted reputaion is not matched by actual on ground performance and which suffers from a tendency to embark on private wars.
Brian Cloughley has done a remarkable job in writing a fairly critical history of the Pakistan Army.Most of the factual errors were avoidable but something which should have been taken care of by the publishers who knew that the author was a foreigner and did not have the time to cross check or recheck all the facts because of not permanently residing in Pakistan.The author appears to be too much of a gentleman to critically analyse many of the Quixotic blunders of Indo Pak military history. Nevertheless Brian Cloughley’s book has filled a void in Indo Pak military history by at least constructing a continuous and fairly comprehensive picture of one of third worlds important armies.Regardless of the fact whether any one may agree or disagree with Cloghley’s analysios.the book by and large retains the position of a book which is compulsory for any layman or foreigner doing research on the Pakistan Army.The best defense of a country lies in its national motivation and continuous process of indoctrination aimed at stimulating our people to develop and strengthen faith and confidence in ourselves, and to stand up to any challenge and threat to security of our ideological and geographical borders. All of us in our own different ways are in fact involved in the defence of the country. The farmer or the office hand, the WAPDA lineman or the foundry worker, the professional of one category or another, even the artist, poet or writer who provides intellectual stimulation or aesthetic enjoyment, are all participants in the effort. But the gentlemen in uniform do in the longer view seem to be an endangered species. They lay their life in the sacred cause of defending their country so it becomes a moral duty of the entire nation to look after their siblings and other family members. Pakistan Armed Forces have developed their own system of welfare to help them into a befitting manner.The relentless services of Pakistan Armed Forces to the nation at the time of natural disasters are very well known and recognized by the nation. The latest example in this regard is the response of Pakistan Armed Forces to the earthquake of Oct 2005. Despite having their own bunkers destroyed and casualties suffered, they stood firm against the disaster with courage and determination driven by the will to serve the nation and faced the onslaught of the earthquake bravely. Within short span of two years ERRA, with the assistance of civilian sector under the umbrella of Pakistan Armed Forces, acted upon the policy of "build back better" successfully in steering the society towards the socio – economic stability. As a matter of fact Pakistan Armed Forces have devised regular and continuous systems to help the needees and people in trouble. Pakistan Armed Forces are not only the defenders of the motherland and guardians of the frontiers; they play a vital role in development of Pakistan. The development arena includes socio-economic and cultural sectors. Pakistan Armed forces have a very well organized welfare system. These welfare organizations like FWO, AWT, NLC, SCO, Fauji Foundation, Shaheen Foundation and Bahria Foundation are not only serving for the retired/serving officers and Jawans, and the families of martyrs and disabled but also provide their services for the entire countrymen like provision of jobs and services to a major number of civilians. The other welfare measures include relief and rehabilitation of the effectees of natural catastrophes, establishment of educational institutes, provision of medical assistance, slides clearance, construction of roads, dams, bridges and many more services.The most appreciable thing for the Armed Forces is that soon after the creation of Pakistan; Pakistan Armed Forces reorganized themselves and paid attention to generate funds and resources for themselves through their corporate organizations and self-financing mechanism. Pakistan Armed Forces have completed a number of development projects to generate funds in order to paddle their own canoe.There is no denying the fact that the Indian leadership never reconciled with the existence of Pakistan . They opposed its creation tooth and nail on one pretext or the other but they were unable to frustrate the strategy of Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah. After the creation of Pakistan , the Indians have made continuous and concerted efforts to annihilate Pakistan . They have succeeded in seceding East Pakistan from us. The wars between India and Pakistan have been the wars between two ideologies though the apparent causes have been different. The Indian government’s persistent refusal to pay heed to the world opinion on the question of Kashmir has been another major root cause of confrontation between the two countries. The performance of Pakistan Army in the Indo-Pak Wars has been extremely commendable. A few glimpses in the paragraphs that follow.By November 1947 Auchinleck, Supreme Commander based in New Delhi, being convinced that Indian Cabinet was seeking to destroy and undo Pakistan by economic and military means, was forced to resign. As the build-up of Indian forces in Jammu and Kashmir continued, Pakistan Army units were being hurriedly organized and equipped without any base for manufacture of ammunition, signal stores, equipment or vehicles. Simultaneously, Pakistan National Guards were raised from ex-servicemen and other volunteers along border areas to provide a second line of defence. By February 1948 Indian build up in Jammu and Kashmir reached five brigades plus, under two full-fledged division Headquarters. Our 101 Brigade, commanded by Brigadier Akbar Khan was rushed into the critical front to forestall and halt the Indian offensive along Uri-Muzaffarabad axis. In April 1948, Commander-in-Chief Pakistan Army appreciating the threats in the north along Muzaffarabad-Kohala axis, and in the south along Bhimber-Mirpur-Poonch axis further reinforced the front with elements of 7 Division to halt the Indian offensive at Chakothi. Reinforcements were rushed overnight to Tithwal sector to defend Muzaffarabad front 9(F) Division was also moved to reinforce 7 Division in Tithwal, Uri and Bagh sectors. 7 Division was thereafter moved to the southern front. In May Pakistan informed the United Nations of these moves. By June, Pakistan had five brigades in Jammu and Kashmir together with Azad Kashmir forces and elements of the para-military Frontier Corps, holding twelve Indian brigades (with 4 to 5 battalions each) supported by armour, artillery and Indian Air Force. Indian summer offensive was decisively beaten and halted. Some months later, two brigades of 8 Division from Quetta further reinforced Muzaffarabad-Uri front.On 14 August 1948, the first anniversary of Pakistan , General Headquarters sent the following message to the Quaid-e-Azam, “Loyal and grateful greetings from the Army on the first anniversary of Independence Day. We serve and shall serve Pakistan with all our hearts and souls. Pakistan and its Creator, Zindabad.” The Quaid-e-Azam was at that time in Quetta, fighting his own battle for survival against a deadly affliction. In December, Pakistan Army planned to go on the offensive, ‘Operation Venus’, with 7 Division to cut off the main supply route at Beri Pattan Bridge area, and isolate Indian forces in Nowshera-Jhangar-Poonch sector. On 14 December, in a pre-attack artillery bombardment the Beri Pattan bridge area containing ammunition, rations, petrol and supplies in a two-mile area was totally destroyed together with Indian divisional Headquarter, isolating the Indian forces in that sector. The Indian Army was taken by surprise. At midnight on 30 December, India asked for ceasefire with effect from 1 January 1949. Pakistan accepted, as the fate of Jammu and Kashmir had been taken over by the United Nations. By early 1949 Pakistan Army had completed its formative stage. It halted the Indian offensive and prevented it from totally over-running Jammu and Kashmir, and closing up to Pakistan ’s vital border areas, thus ended the war in Jammu and Kashmir. Pakistan Army continued its reorganization. An ordnance factory to produce small arms and ammunition was established at Wah. The threat from India was by no means over. In spring of 1950 and again between July and October 1951 the Indian Army concentrated on Pakistan‘s borders and transgressed into Azad Kashmir and West Pakistan territory forty eight times. The Indian Air Force violated Pakistan ’s air space thirty times thus bringing the two countries very close to another all out war through India ’s coercive diplomacy and interventionist strategy.The Indian forces intruded into Pakistani area in the Rann of Kutch in April 1965. In a sharp and short conflict, the Indian forces were ejected. Both the armies had fully mobilized, with eyeball to eyeball contact. Pakistan proposed cease-fire, India accepted. An agreement was signed: the forces disengaged. The Award by the Arbitration Tribunal vindicated Pakistan ’s Position.Past midnight on 5/6 September, without a formal declaration of war, Indian Army crossed the international border and attacked Lahore and Kasur fronts. Pakistan Army and Pakistan Air Force halted the attack in its tracks, inflicting heavy casualties on the aggressor. On 7 September a single Pakistan Air Force Pilot, Squadron Leader M.M. Alam, Sitara-i-Juraat, in his F-86 Sabre shot down five Indian Air Force attacking Hunter aircraft in a single sortie, an unbeaten world record “On night 6/7 September three teams of our Special Services Groups were para-dropped on Indian Air Force bases at Pathankot, Adampur and Halwara to neutralize them.To relieve pressure on Lahore front, on night 7/8 September, after crossing two major water obstacles in a bold thrust, Pakistani armoured and mechanized formations supported by artillery and Pakistan Air Force overran area Khem Karn, 6 to 8 miles inside Indian territory. Vital Indian positions at Sulemanki and across Rajasthan and Sindh were also captured in bold, swift attacks.On night 7/8 September, 1 Corps of Indian Army launched its main effort east of Sialkot with one armoured and three infantry divisions on our extended 15 Division front, screened only by gallant 3 Frontier Force and B Company 13 Frontier Force (Reconnaissance & Support). 24 Infantry Brigade (Brigadier A.A Malik, Hilal-i-Juraat) on the move in area Pasrur, rushed 25 Cavalry (Lieutenant Colonel Nisar Ahmad, Sitara-i-Juraat), on 8 September to delay and disrupt enemy thrusts. As soon as the presence of Indian 1 Armoured Division was confirmed, Pakistan Army rushed forward to stop the onslaught on a 30-mile front. The biggest tank battle since World War II was fought on the Chwinda front by 6 Armoured Division with under command 24 Infantry Brigade Groups and valiantly supported by 4 Corps Artillery (Brigadier A.A.K. Choudhry, Hilal-i-Juraat). The main effort of the Indian Army was blunted, inflicting heavy and troop casualties. Pakistan Air Force support helped turn the tide of the battle. Before a counter offensive by 6 Armoured Division on 22 September could be launched, Indian asked for cease-fire in the United Nations. India ’s aggression against our international borders without a formal declaration of war had cost it, apart from heavy personnel, material land economic losses, 1617 sq. miles of territory as compared to 446 sq. miles of our open and undefended territory. Pakistan Army captured 20 officers, 19 Junior Commissioned Officers, and 569 Other Ranks.
With 1971 commenced the most tragic year of our history. Failing to resolve a political problem by political means, a Martial Law regime, manipulated by some megalomaniac politicians, resorted to military action in East Pakistan on night 25/26 March. Widespread insurgency broke out. Personnel of two infantry divisions and Civil Armed Forces with weapons were airlifted in Pakistan International Airlines planes, over-flying about 5000 miles non stop via Sri Lanka in the first week of April 1971 – the longest operational air move by Pakistan Army. By May near normalcy had been restored, thanks to the fast reaction, dedication and cool courage of our soldiers, sailors and airmen operating in a hostile environment under adverse climatic and terrain conditions, without adequate logistic or medical support. India’s immoral covert armed intervention having failed, by October it had concentrated four times our strength in over 12 divisions (400,000) supported by five regiments of tanks, and about 50,000 activists trained and equipped by Indian Army. Indian Navy’s one aircraft carrier, eight destroyers/frigates, two submarines and three landing craft, against our four gunboats, eight Chinese coasters and two landing craft supported them. Eleven Indian Air Force squadrons – 4 Hunter, 1 SU-7, 3 Gnat and 3 MiG 21 – from five airfields around East Pakistan faced our one valiant Number 14 squadron of F-86F Sabres based on a single airfield around Dhaka.On 21 November, Eid day, when our fatigued soldiers had been operating in the most hostile environment for almost ten months, including a month of fasting, the Indian army felt emboldened enough to launch a full scale invasion at over twenty fronts in the east, west and north of East Pakistan. Divisions attacked our brigade positions; brigades attacked our battalion, company and platoon positions, supported by their armour, artillery and lair force. When most of our defensive positions, rooted to the ground, could not be overrun, Indian forces after suffering heavy casualties resorted to outflanking moves. The aggressors could not capture, till the cease-fire; on 16 December, a single town except Jessore, which was not defended for strategic reasons. For the Pakistani soldiers this was their finest hour, fighting against heavy odds with their backs to the wall inflicting heavy casualties, bloodied but unbowed” when an Indian commander, through a messenger asked for our Jamalpur battalion to surrender, encircled by two brigades, the commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel Sultan Ahmad, Sitara-i-Juraat of 31 Baloch replied kin a message wrapped around a bullet which read, “I want to tell you that the fighting you have seen so far is very little; in fact the fighting has not even started. So let us stop negotiating and start the fight.” Similarly 4 Frontier Force under 205 Brigade (Brigadier Tajammul Malik) held out at Hilli for l19 days against 6 battalions, inflicting heavy casualties, till withdrawn on 11 December, after getting outflanked. Similar hard fought actions took place at Bahaduria and elsewhere by Punjab, Baloch, Frontier Force and Azad Kashmir units all arms and services, and Civil Armed Forces including West Pakistan Rangers and police units. 107 Brigades (Brigadier Mohammad Hayat, Sitara-i-Juraat) held at bay a division of 5 brigades and 2 armour regiments at Khulna inflicting heavy casualties till 17 December and ceased fighting only after repeated orders of our Eastern Command. On the West Pakistan front, on 3 December 1971, India attacked with the main effort against Shakargarh sector with three infantry divisions supported by three armoured brigades against our 8 Division front, operating under our 1 Corps (Commander Lieutenant General Irshad Ahmad Khan). The attack was halted in the tracks, inflicting heavy casualties. 8 (Independent) Armoured Brigade (Brigadier Mohammad Ahmed, Sitara-i-Juraat) effectively blocked and destroyed enemy penetration our minefield and saved Zafarwal from being outflanked by enemy armour. In Jammu and Kashmir, Chhamb, Lahore, Kasur, Sulemanki and Rajasthan sectors, war was carried into Indian territory, with success at some points, not so successfully at others due to inadequate forces and air support. For the Pakistan Army, Navy and Air Force this conflict was their finest hour. Fighting against overwhelming odds in both wings of the country raged with full fury. Before our counter offensive could be launched in West Pakistan, India asked for cease-fire in the United Nations. The Ghazis and Shaheeds proved in their supreme hour of trial all the military virtues of Faith, Honour, Valour, Fortitude, Endurance, Loyalty, Group Cohesion and Unlimited Liability, and above all, the spirit of Jehad. On 4 December 1971, the United States moved a draft resolution calling for cease-fire and withdrawal of Indian forces, which was vetoed by United States of Southern Russia. Thereafter, another six resolutions including one by China were introduced calling for cease-fire and withdrawal of forces, some of which were accepted by Pakistan authorities. However, due to behind the scene political machinations by India and her allies their passage and implementation was stalled till Dhaka fell on 16 December 1971 and the cease-fire had been perfidiously converted to surrender.” I took a careful look at the documents and was aghast to see the heading – which read Instrument of ‘Surrender’……” writes Lieutenant General J.F.R.Jacob, Chief of Staff, Indian, Eastern Army. (Lieutenant General J.F.R.Jacob, “Surrender at Dacca: Birth of a Nation).Flawed national and operational strategy proved to; be disastrous for Pakistan , both politically and militarily. Power, national and operational strategy, the methodology of crisis and conflict management, and higher direction of war in which we had been found wanting in 1971.
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