Showing posts with label Wedding. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Wedding. Show all posts
Pak Army
Pak Army
Brian Cloughley’s book on the Pakistan Army is a welcome addition to the extremely limited number of books on the Pakistan Army.The fact that such a book was not written by a Pakistani soldier or a civilian scholar does not paint a very bright picture about the state of history writing,or to be more specific military history writing in Pakistan.Brian Cloughley has the singular advantage of having served for a relatively long period in Pakistan as a UN Official and as a military attache.In addition he is also a soldier and thus his perception of military affairs is different from a scholar who is a civilian and thus suffers from certain limitations which can only be overcome by extraordinary analytical ability and painstaking hard research.Brian Cloughley has made an honest attempt to present things as they are or as he percieved them to be with whatever facts he could lay hands to and the result is a relatively significant work on Pakistani military history with reference to on ground military performance of the Pakistan Army in three Indo Pak wars.On the whole Cloughley’s account is fairly balanced and the layman reader can form a fairly continuous picture of the progress of the Pakistan Army from 1947 to date.The initial history of the Pakistan Army however is given a broad brush treatment and the British Indian Colonial social and military legacy is totally ignored.This leaves the reader with an impression that the Pakistan Army was an entity created in 1947 and all that it did from 1947 onwards had little connection with the pre 1947 British Colonial policy and the military experience of the Indian Army in the two world wars.The 1947-48 Kashmir War where the Pakistan Army got its baptism of fire as the independent army of a sovereign country is hardly discussed.Thus important military controversies like the Operation Venus Controversy etc are not discussed at all.The conduct of Kashmir War by the Pakistani civilian leadership and and its resultant impact on the army’s perception of the civilian leadership is not discussed.The British recruitment policy and their irrational advocacy of the "Martial Races Theory" is not discussed at all.The impact of the conservative British military heritage on the intellectual development of the post 1947 Pakistani military leadership is totally ignored.The Ayub period has been given a relatively more detailed treatment and the conduct of 1965 war is reasonably detailed and the analysis of military operations is objective,critical and thought provoking.No serious effort is however made to explain why the Pakistan Army failed to achieve any decisive breakthrough despite having technically superior equipment as well as numerical superiority in tanks.The 1971 war which was more of a one sided show and a war in which Indian victory in the Eastern Theatre in words of Field Marshal Mankekshaw was a "foregone conclusion" keeping in view the overwhelming Indian numerical superiority1 ,has been discussed in much greater detail than 1965 war.This is a serious draw back since 1965 deserved more space because it had more lessons keeping in view the fact that both sides employed their strategic reserves.The post 1971 history of the army has been given a better treatment and enables the layman reader to understand many aspects of the present state of confrontation in the Sub Continent.There are many factual and analytical errors in the book which were entirely avoidable and were not beyond the author or the publishers control.The publisher shares a major responsibility in ensuring accuracy of facts while analytical errors or analytical drawbacks are more within an authors sphere of responsibility.15 Lancers was not raised in 1948-50 but in 19552.Iskandar Mirza was not from the ICS (Indian Civil Service) but the Indian Political Service3.The author has asserted that Ayub Khan was "gallant in combat" 4but there is no record of it in terms of gallantry awards or mention in despatches.On the contrary Ayub was accused of tactical timidity in Burma5.Akhnur has been mentioned as the only road link to Kashmir6 whereas Akhnur ,as a matter of fact was the only road link to Poonch Valley only.The Indian 50 Para Brigade was not moved on 7th September to relieve the 54 Brigade as asserted on page-87 but made its appearance in the 15 Division area only on 10th September and that too in the Hudiara Drain area7.On page-96 the author states that 13 Dogra in 4 Indian Mountain Division area captured Bedian but was driven out by 7 Punjab’s counter attack the next day.In reality 13 Dogra never attacked Bedian ,nor was Bedian defended by 7 Punjab.Bedian was defended by 7 Baluch and attacked by 17 Rajput.Further Bedian was not attacked by a unit from the 4 Mountain Division but by a unit of 7 Indian Division which failed to capture it in the first place8.Jassar was not defended by a Pakistani Tank Troop as written on page-110 but by the whole 33 Tank Delivery Unit9.The Jassar operation did not result in release of a whole Indian tank regiment but release of two infantry battalions and a squadron minus10.4 FF was not part of 6 Armoured Division as stated on page-117.The whole "Order of Battle" of the Pakistan Army on the Western Front as given on page-225 is incorrect.Formations of the I Corps have thus been shown as formations of 11 Corps and vice versa.8 Armoured Brigade which was a part of 1 Corps has been shown as part of 4 Corps.Rahimuddin Khan has been promoted to Zia’s son in law on page-275 whereas Ejaz ul Haq was Rahim’s son in law. Aziz Ahmad the famous civil servant has been described as Aziz Ali9a.The order of battle of the Pakistan Army on page-284 has also some factual errors;eg Pakistan Army does not have any mechanised infantry divisions whereas the author has shown two divisions as mechanised divisions.One tank unit allotted to Pakistan in 1947 ie the 19 Lancers has not been listed at all in the list of armoured units allotted to Pakistan10.
The author rightly wonders why some military commanders guilty of timidity in Khem Karan were not immediately sacked!But he fails to mention that one of them was promoted to the rank of major general few years after the war.His analysis of the Khem Karan operations is considerably thought provoking.But the major reason for failure of the Khem Karan offensive ie poor initial planning which led to traffic congestion and poor engineers effort and delayed the concentration of the Pakistani 1st Armoured Division has not been discussed at all.The author however rightly points out that failure to carry out thorough reconnaissance was one of the major reasons of failure of the Pakistani armoured thrusts failure in Khem Karan.However his assertion that the Indians had considerable reserves to contain Pakistan Army even if it had achieved a breakthrough is not based on material facts.India did have its 23 Mountain Division,but this formation was nowhere near Khem Karan when the Pakistani offensive was launched.In any case a Mountain Infantry division could have been of little value against the Pakistani 1 Armoured Division.The analysis of the tank battles in Sialkot is not comprehensive and lacks depth.The authors assertion on page-120 that the ad hoc force under direct command of the I Pakistani Corps forced the Indians back to the border is not correct11.The 24 Brigade which did so was a part of the 15 Division and 25 Cavalry the tank unit which in the words of Indians stopped them acted on orders of its commanding officer alone and 1 Corps Headquarter had little idea of what 25 Cavalry did in stopping the Indians till the evening of 8th September.The author has not mentioned 25 Cavalry at all which in words of the Indian Armoured Corps’s historian; was the unit whose " performance was certainly creditable because it alone stood between the Indian 1st Armoured Division and its objective,the MRL Canal 11a" and stopped the 1st Indian Armoured Division on 8th September,all by itself.The authors reproduction of the Indian writer Verghese’s views that the Indian 1st Armoured Division dashed forward rashly is not based on facts.The Indian advance was fairly balanced and it was halted on 8th September not because the Indians had completely committed their armour but because the Commander 1st Armoured Brigade lost his nerve because of false and unsubstantiated reports of his flanks being under counter attack at a time when both the advancing Indian tank regiments had committed a total of only three squadrons with three squadrons uncommitted and the Indian 1st Armoured Division had a third tank regiment totally fresh and in a position to easily outflank the Pakistani armour in Gadgor area12.The author has also not discussed at all the Indian armours total lack of activity on 9th and 10th September.This inactivity at a time when there was just one tank regiment to oppose five Indian tank regiments was the main reason for the Indian main attack’s failure in Sialkot Sector.The treatment of the 1971 war is far more detailed than 1965 war.All the emphasis is however on the Eastern Theatre where the Indian victory in words of the Indian Chief was a foregone conclusion.The author has highlighted actions of bravery at small unit level and has shown that the Pakistan Army put up a good show in East Pakistan as far as the junior leadership was concerned.The battles on the Western Theatre have however been largely ignored and the battle of Chhamb which was described by the Indians as "the most serious reverse suffered in the 1971 war 13" has not been discussed in much detail.Major General Eftikhar was the finest commander at the operational level as far as the Pakistan Army is conerned and any history of Pakistan Army is incomplete without discussing Eftikhar’s brilliant opearational leadership in Chhamb.Eftikhar was one of the only two Pakistani senior commanders praised by the Indian military historians.One Indian military historian described him as one who "showed skill and determination in carrying out his mission" .14
The analysis of the Bhutto period is quite comprehensive and the personality of Mr Bhutto and his attitude towards the army has been described quite correctly.The sycophantic persoanlity of Zia has however been given a generous treatment and many of Zia’s well known antics to please Mr Bhutto like orders to all officers of Multan Garrison to line up their wives to greet Mr Bhutto’s cavalcade passing through the Fort Colony have not been discussed at all.The intelligence and operational failure in Siachen on part of the ISI and the formation responsible for the defence of Siachen as a result of which the Indians were able to infiltrate 35 miles inside Pakistani territory have not been discussed at all.On the contary General Pirdad who was the formation commander during the Siachen debacle has been praised as an admirable officer15.The authors assertion that English language was neglected during the Zia era is not based on facts.I was a cadet in Zia’s tenure at the Pakistan Military Academy.Any cadet who failed in English was not promoted to the next term and English teaching and examination standards were very tough.The crux of the problem was the overall deteriorating English standards in Pakistan following Bhuttos nationalisation of educational institutuins and the relatively poor material joining the army in the post 1971 era.The post Zia era has been covered in a very incisive manner.The authors assertion that the "Director infantry" was a post that any infantry officerw ould welcome is incorrect.Mahor General Zahir Ul Islam Abbasi was posted as Director Infantry following a diasastorous Charge of the light Brigade type attack in Siachen which he had ordered without prior approval of his next senior operational headquarter. in which one of the Pakistani units suffered unnecesarily high casualties including the death of a brigade commander.The authors criticism of the ISI is forthright,accurate and thought provoking.In this regard he has shown courage in criticising a top heavy agency whose much trumpeted reputaion is not matched by actual on ground performance and which suffers from a tendency to embark on private wars.
Brian Cloughley has done a remarkable job in writing a fairly critical history of the Pakistan Army.Most of the factual errors were avoidable but something which should have been taken care of by the publishers who knew that the author was a foreigner and did not have the time to cross check or recheck all the facts because of not permanently residing in Pakistan.The author appears to be too much of a gentleman to critically analyse many of the Quixotic blunders of Indo Pak military history. Nevertheless Brian Cloughley’s book has filled a void in Indo Pak military history by at least constructing a continuous and fairly comprehensive picture of one of third worlds important armies.Regardless of the fact whether any one may agree or disagree with Cloghley’s analysios.the book by and large retains the position of a book which is compulsory for any layman or foreigner doing research on the Pakistan Army.The best defense of a country lies in its national motivation and continuous process of indoctrination aimed at stimulating our people to develop and strengthen faith and confidence in ourselves, and to stand up to any challenge and threat to security of our ideological and geographical borders. All of us in our own different ways are in fact involved in the defence of the country. The farmer or the office hand, the WAPDA lineman or the foundry worker, the professional of one category or another, even the artist, poet or writer who provides intellectual stimulation or aesthetic enjoyment, are all participants in the effort. But the gentlemen in uniform do in the longer view seem to be an endangered species. They lay their life in the sacred cause of defending their country so it becomes a moral duty of the entire nation to look after their siblings and other family members. Pakistan Armed Forces have developed their own system of welfare to help them into a befitting manner.The relentless services of Pakistan Armed Forces to the nation at the time of natural disasters are very well known and recognized by the nation. The latest example in this regard is the response of Pakistan Armed Forces to the earthquake of Oct 2005. Despite having their own bunkers destroyed and casualties suffered, they stood firm against the disaster with courage and determination driven by the will to serve the nation and faced the onslaught of the earthquake bravely. Within short span of two years ERRA, with the assistance of civilian sector under the umbrella of Pakistan Armed Forces, acted upon the policy of "build back better" successfully in steering the society towards the socio – economic stability. As a matter of fact Pakistan Armed Forces have devised regular and continuous systems to help the needees and people in trouble. Pakistan Armed Forces are not only the defenders of the motherland and guardians of the frontiers; they play a vital role in development of Pakistan. The development arena includes socio-economic and cultural sectors. Pakistan Armed forces have a very well organized welfare system. These welfare organizations like FWO, AWT, NLC, SCO, Fauji Foundation, Shaheen Foundation and Bahria Foundation are not only serving for the retired/serving officers and Jawans, and the families of martyrs and disabled but also provide their services for the entire countrymen like provision of jobs and services to a major number of civilians. The other welfare measures include relief and rehabilitation of the effectees of natural catastrophes, establishment of educational institutes, provision of medical assistance, slides clearance, construction of roads, dams, bridges and many more services.The most appreciable thing for the Armed Forces is that soon after the creation of Pakistan; Pakistan Armed Forces reorganized themselves and paid attention to generate funds and resources for themselves through their corporate organizations and self-financing mechanism. Pakistan Armed Forces have completed a number of development projects to generate funds in order to paddle their own canoe.There is no denying the fact that the Indian leadership never reconciled with the existence of Pakistan . They opposed its creation tooth and nail on one pretext or the other but they were unable to frustrate the strategy of Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah. After the creation of Pakistan , the Indians have made continuous and concerted efforts to annihilate Pakistan . They have succeeded in seceding East Pakistan from us. The wars between India and Pakistan have been the wars between two ideologies though the apparent causes have been different. The Indian government’s persistent refusal to pay heed to the world opinion on the question of Kashmir has been another major root cause of confrontation between the two countries. The performance of Pakistan Army in the Indo-Pak Wars has been extremely commendable. A few glimpses in the paragraphs that follow.By November 1947 Auchinleck, Supreme Commander based in New Delhi, being convinced that Indian Cabinet was seeking to destroy and undo Pakistan by economic and military means, was forced to resign. As the build-up of Indian forces in Jammu and Kashmir continued, Pakistan Army units were being hurriedly organized and equipped without any base for manufacture of ammunition, signal stores, equipment or vehicles. Simultaneously, Pakistan National Guards were raised from ex-servicemen and other volunteers along border areas to provide a second line of defence. By February 1948 Indian build up in Jammu and Kashmir reached five brigades plus, under two full-fledged division Headquarters. Our 101 Brigade, commanded by Brigadier Akbar Khan was rushed into the critical front to forestall and halt the Indian offensive along Uri-Muzaffarabad axis. In April 1948, Commander-in-Chief Pakistan Army appreciating the threats in the north along Muzaffarabad-Kohala axis, and in the south along Bhimber-Mirpur-Poonch axis further reinforced the front with elements of 7 Division to halt the Indian offensive at Chakothi. Reinforcements were rushed overnight to Tithwal sector to defend Muzaffarabad front 9(F) Division was also moved to reinforce 7 Division in Tithwal, Uri and Bagh sectors. 7 Division was thereafter moved to the southern front. In May Pakistan informed the United Nations of these moves. By June, Pakistan had five brigades in Jammu and Kashmir together with Azad Kashmir forces and elements of the para-military Frontier Corps, holding twelve Indian brigades (with 4 to 5 battalions each) supported by armour, artillery and Indian Air Force. Indian summer offensive was decisively beaten and halted. Some months later, two brigades of 8 Division from Quetta further reinforced Muzaffarabad-Uri front.On 14 August 1948, the first anniversary of Pakistan , General Headquarters sent the following message to the Quaid-e-Azam, “Loyal and grateful greetings from the Army on the first anniversary of Independence Day. We serve and shall serve Pakistan with all our hearts and souls. Pakistan and its Creator, Zindabad.” The Quaid-e-Azam was at that time in Quetta, fighting his own battle for survival against a deadly affliction. In December, Pakistan Army planned to go on the offensive, ‘Operation Venus’, with 7 Division to cut off the main supply route at Beri Pattan Bridge area, and isolate Indian forces in Nowshera-Jhangar-Poonch sector. On 14 December, in a pre-attack artillery bombardment the Beri Pattan bridge area containing ammunition, rations, petrol and supplies in a two-mile area was totally destroyed together with Indian divisional Headquarter, isolating the Indian forces in that sector. The Indian Army was taken by surprise. At midnight on 30 December, India asked for ceasefire with effect from 1 January 1949. Pakistan accepted, as the fate of Jammu and Kashmir had been taken over by the United Nations. By early 1949 Pakistan Army had completed its formative stage. It halted the Indian offensive and prevented it from totally over-running Jammu and Kashmir, and closing up to Pakistan ’s vital border areas, thus ended the war in Jammu and Kashmir. Pakistan Army continued its reorganization. An ordnance factory to produce small arms and ammunition was established at Wah. The threat from India was by no means over. In spring of 1950 and again between July and October 1951 the Indian Army concentrated on Pakistan‘s borders and transgressed into Azad Kashmir and West Pakistan territory forty eight times. The Indian Air Force violated Pakistan ’s air space thirty times thus bringing the two countries very close to another all out war through India ’s coercive diplomacy and interventionist strategy.The Indian forces intruded into Pakistani area in the Rann of Kutch in April 1965. In a sharp and short conflict, the Indian forces were ejected. Both the armies had fully mobilized, with eyeball to eyeball contact. Pakistan proposed cease-fire, India accepted. An agreement was signed: the forces disengaged. The Award by the Arbitration Tribunal vindicated Pakistan ’s Position.Past midnight on 5/6 September, without a formal declaration of war, Indian Army crossed the international border and attacked Lahore and Kasur fronts. Pakistan Army and Pakistan Air Force halted the attack in its tracks, inflicting heavy casualties on the aggressor. On 7 September a single Pakistan Air Force Pilot, Squadron Leader M.M. Alam, Sitara-i-Juraat, in his F-86 Sabre shot down five Indian Air Force attacking Hunter aircraft in a single sortie, an unbeaten world record “On night 6/7 September three teams of our Special Services Groups were para-dropped on Indian Air Force bases at Pathankot, Adampur and Halwara to neutralize them.To relieve pressure on Lahore front, on night 7/8 September, after crossing two major water obstacles in a bold thrust, Pakistani armoured and mechanized formations supported by artillery and Pakistan Air Force overran area Khem Karn, 6 to 8 miles inside Indian territory. Vital Indian positions at Sulemanki and across Rajasthan and Sindh were also captured in bold, swift attacks.On night 7/8 September, 1 Corps of Indian Army launched its main effort east of Sialkot with one armoured and three infantry divisions on our extended 15 Division front, screened only by gallant 3 Frontier Force and B Company 13 Frontier Force (Reconnaissance & Support). 24 Infantry Brigade (Brigadier A.A Malik, Hilal-i-Juraat) on the move in area Pasrur, rushed 25 Cavalry (Lieutenant Colonel Nisar Ahmad, Sitara-i-Juraat), on 8 September to delay and disrupt enemy thrusts. As soon as the presence of Indian 1 Armoured Division was confirmed, Pakistan Army rushed forward to stop the onslaught on a 30-mile front. The biggest tank battle since World War II was fought on the Chwinda front by 6 Armoured Division with under command 24 Infantry Brigade Groups and valiantly supported by 4 Corps Artillery (Brigadier A.A.K. Choudhry, Hilal-i-Juraat). The main effort of the Indian Army was blunted, inflicting heavy and troop casualties. Pakistan Air Force support helped turn the tide of the battle. Before a counter offensive by 6 Armoured Division on 22 September could be launched, Indian asked for cease-fire in the United Nations. India ’s aggression against our international borders without a formal declaration of war had cost it, apart from heavy personnel, material land economic losses, 1617 sq. miles of territory as compared to 446 sq. miles of our open and undefended territory. Pakistan Army captured 20 officers, 19 Junior Commissioned Officers, and 569 Other Ranks.
With 1971 commenced the most tragic year of our history. Failing to resolve a political problem by political means, a Martial Law regime, manipulated by some megalomaniac politicians, resorted to military action in East Pakistan on night 25/26 March. Widespread insurgency broke out. Personnel of two infantry divisions and Civil Armed Forces with weapons were airlifted in Pakistan International Airlines planes, over-flying about 5000 miles non stop via Sri Lanka in the first week of April 1971 – the longest operational air move by Pakistan Army. By May near normalcy had been restored, thanks to the fast reaction, dedication and cool courage of our soldiers, sailors and airmen operating in a hostile environment under adverse climatic and terrain conditions, without adequate logistic or medical support. India’s immoral covert armed intervention having failed, by October it had concentrated four times our strength in over 12 divisions (400,000) supported by five regiments of tanks, and about 50,000 activists trained and equipped by Indian Army. Indian Navy’s one aircraft carrier, eight destroyers/frigates, two submarines and three landing craft, against our four gunboats, eight Chinese coasters and two landing craft supported them. Eleven Indian Air Force squadrons – 4 Hunter, 1 SU-7, 3 Gnat and 3 MiG 21 – from five airfields around East Pakistan faced our one valiant Number 14 squadron of F-86F Sabres based on a single airfield around Dhaka.On 21 November, Eid day, when our fatigued soldiers had been operating in the most hostile environment for almost ten months, including a month of fasting, the Indian army felt emboldened enough to launch a full scale invasion at over twenty fronts in the east, west and north of East Pakistan. Divisions attacked our brigade positions; brigades attacked our battalion, company and platoon positions, supported by their armour, artillery and lair force. When most of our defensive positions, rooted to the ground, could not be overrun, Indian forces after suffering heavy casualties resorted to outflanking moves. The aggressors could not capture, till the cease-fire; on 16 December, a single town except Jessore, which was not defended for strategic reasons. For the Pakistani soldiers this was their finest hour, fighting against heavy odds with their backs to the wall inflicting heavy casualties, bloodied but unbowed” when an Indian commander, through a messenger asked for our Jamalpur battalion to surrender, encircled by two brigades, the commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel Sultan Ahmad, Sitara-i-Juraat of 31 Baloch replied kin a message wrapped around a bullet which read, “I want to tell you that the fighting you have seen so far is very little; in fact the fighting has not even started. So let us stop negotiating and start the fight.” Similarly 4 Frontier Force under 205 Brigade (Brigadier Tajammul Malik) held out at Hilli for l19 days against 6 battalions, inflicting heavy casualties, till withdrawn on 11 December, after getting outflanked. Similar hard fought actions took place at Bahaduria and elsewhere by Punjab, Baloch, Frontier Force and Azad Kashmir units all arms and services, and Civil Armed Forces including West Pakistan Rangers and police units. 107 Brigades (Brigadier Mohammad Hayat, Sitara-i-Juraat) held at bay a division of 5 brigades and 2 armour regiments at Khulna inflicting heavy casualties till 17 December and ceased fighting only after repeated orders of our Eastern Command. On the West Pakistan front, on 3 December 1971, India attacked with the main effort against Shakargarh sector with three infantry divisions supported by three armoured brigades against our 8 Division front, operating under our 1 Corps (Commander Lieutenant General Irshad Ahmad Khan). The attack was halted in the tracks, inflicting heavy casualties. 8 (Independent) Armoured Brigade (Brigadier Mohammad Ahmed, Sitara-i-Juraat) effectively blocked and destroyed enemy penetration our minefield and saved Zafarwal from being outflanked by enemy armour. In Jammu and Kashmir, Chhamb, Lahore, Kasur, Sulemanki and Rajasthan sectors, war was carried into Indian territory, with success at some points, not so successfully at others due to inadequate forces and air support. For the Pakistan Army, Navy and Air Force this conflict was their finest hour. Fighting against overwhelming odds in both wings of the country raged with full fury. Before our counter offensive could be launched in West Pakistan, India asked for cease-fire in the United Nations. The Ghazis and Shaheeds proved in their supreme hour of trial all the military virtues of Faith, Honour, Valour, Fortitude, Endurance, Loyalty, Group Cohesion and Unlimited Liability, and above all, the spirit of Jehad. On 4 December 1971, the United States moved a draft resolution calling for cease-fire and withdrawal of Indian forces, which was vetoed by United States of Southern Russia. Thereafter, another six resolutions including one by China were introduced calling for cease-fire and withdrawal of forces, some of which were accepted by Pakistan authorities. However, due to behind the scene political machinations by India and her allies their passage and implementation was stalled till Dhaka fell on 16 December 1971 and the cease-fire had been perfidiously converted to surrender.” I took a careful look at the documents and was aghast to see the heading – which read Instrument of ‘Surrender’……” writes Lieutenant General J.F.R.Jacob, Chief of Staff, Indian, Eastern Army. (Lieutenant General J.F.R.Jacob, “Surrender at Dacca: Birth of a Nation).Flawed national and operational strategy proved to; be disastrous for Pakistan , both politically and militarily. Power, national and operational strategy, the methodology of crisis and conflict management, and higher direction of war in which we had been found wanting in 1971.
Brian Cloughley’s book on the Pakistan Army is a welcome addition to the extremely limited number of books on the Pakistan Army.The fact that such a book was not written by a Pakistani soldier or a civilian scholar does not paint a very bright picture about the state of history writing,or to be more specific military history writing in Pakistan.Brian Cloughley has the singular advantage of having served for a relatively long period in Pakistan as a UN Official and as a military attache.In addition he is also a soldier and thus his perception of military affairs is different from a scholar who is a civilian and thus suffers from certain limitations which can only be overcome by extraordinary analytical ability and painstaking hard research.Brian Cloughley has made an honest attempt to present things as they are or as he percieved them to be with whatever facts he could lay hands to and the result is a relatively significant work on Pakistani military history with reference to on ground military performance of the Pakistan Army in three Indo Pak wars.On the whole Cloughley’s account is fairly balanced and the layman reader can form a fairly continuous picture of the progress of the Pakistan Army from 1947 to date.The initial history of the Pakistan Army however is given a broad brush treatment and the British Indian Colonial social and military legacy is totally ignored.This leaves the reader with an impression that the Pakistan Army was an entity created in 1947 and all that it did from 1947 onwards had little connection with the pre 1947 British Colonial policy and the military experience of the Indian Army in the two world wars.The 1947-48 Kashmir War where the Pakistan Army got its baptism of fire as the independent army of a sovereign country is hardly discussed.Thus important military controversies like the Operation Venus Controversy etc are not discussed at all.The conduct of Kashmir War by the Pakistani civilian leadership and and its resultant impact on the army’s perception of the civilian leadership is not discussed.The British recruitment policy and their irrational advocacy of the "Martial Races Theory" is not discussed at all.The impact of the conservative British military heritage on the intellectual development of the post 1947 Pakistani military leadership is totally ignored.The Ayub period has been given a relatively more detailed treatment and the conduct of 1965 war is reasonably detailed and the analysis of military operations is objective,critical and thought provoking.No serious effort is however made to explain why the Pakistan Army failed to achieve any decisive breakthrough despite having technically superior equipment as well as numerical superiority in tanks.The 1971 war which was more of a one sided show and a war in which Indian victory in the Eastern Theatre in words of Field Marshal Mankekshaw was a "foregone conclusion" keeping in view the overwhelming Indian numerical superiority1 ,has been discussed in much greater detail than 1965 war.This is a serious draw back since 1965 deserved more space because it had more lessons keeping in view the fact that both sides employed their strategic reserves.The post 1971 history of the army has been given a better treatment and enables the layman reader to understand many aspects of the present state of confrontation in the Sub Continent.There are many factual and analytical errors in the book which were entirely avoidable and were not beyond the author or the publishers control.The publisher shares a major responsibility in ensuring accuracy of facts while analytical errors or analytical drawbacks are more within an authors sphere of responsibility.15 Lancers was not raised in 1948-50 but in 19552.Iskandar Mirza was not from the ICS (Indian Civil Service) but the Indian Political Service3.The author has asserted that Ayub Khan was "gallant in combat" 4but there is no record of it in terms of gallantry awards or mention in despatches.On the contrary Ayub was accused of tactical timidity in Burma5.Akhnur has been mentioned as the only road link to Kashmir6 whereas Akhnur ,as a matter of fact was the only road link to Poonch Valley only.The Indian 50 Para Brigade was not moved on 7th September to relieve the 54 Brigade as asserted on page-87 but made its appearance in the 15 Division area only on 10th September and that too in the Hudiara Drain area7.On page-96 the author states that 13 Dogra in 4 Indian Mountain Division area captured Bedian but was driven out by 7 Punjab’s counter attack the next day.In reality 13 Dogra never attacked Bedian ,nor was Bedian defended by 7 Punjab.Bedian was defended by 7 Baluch and attacked by 17 Rajput.Further Bedian was not attacked by a unit from the 4 Mountain Division but by a unit of 7 Indian Division which failed to capture it in the first place8.Jassar was not defended by a Pakistani Tank Troop as written on page-110 but by the whole 33 Tank Delivery Unit9.The Jassar operation did not result in release of a whole Indian tank regiment but release of two infantry battalions and a squadron minus10.4 FF was not part of 6 Armoured Division as stated on page-117.The whole "Order of Battle" of the Pakistan Army on the Western Front as given on page-225 is incorrect.Formations of the I Corps have thus been shown as formations of 11 Corps and vice versa.8 Armoured Brigade which was a part of 1 Corps has been shown as part of 4 Corps.Rahimuddin Khan has been promoted to Zia’s son in law on page-275 whereas Ejaz ul Haq was Rahim’s son in law. Aziz Ahmad the famous civil servant has been described as Aziz Ali9a.The order of battle of the Pakistan Army on page-284 has also some factual errors;eg Pakistan Army does not have any mechanised infantry divisions whereas the author has shown two divisions as mechanised divisions.One tank unit allotted to Pakistan in 1947 ie the 19 Lancers has not been listed at all in the list of armoured units allotted to Pakistan10.
The author rightly wonders why some military commanders guilty of timidity in Khem Karan were not immediately sacked!But he fails to mention that one of them was promoted to the rank of major general few years after the war.His analysis of the Khem Karan operations is considerably thought provoking.But the major reason for failure of the Khem Karan offensive ie poor initial planning which led to traffic congestion and poor engineers effort and delayed the concentration of the Pakistani 1st Armoured Division has not been discussed at all.The author however rightly points out that failure to carry out thorough reconnaissance was one of the major reasons of failure of the Pakistani armoured thrusts failure in Khem Karan.However his assertion that the Indians had considerable reserves to contain Pakistan Army even if it had achieved a breakthrough is not based on material facts.India did have its 23 Mountain Division,but this formation was nowhere near Khem Karan when the Pakistani offensive was launched.In any case a Mountain Infantry division could have been of little value against the Pakistani 1 Armoured Division.The analysis of the tank battles in Sialkot is not comprehensive and lacks depth.The authors assertion on page-120 that the ad hoc force under direct command of the I Pakistani Corps forced the Indians back to the border is not correct11.The 24 Brigade which did so was a part of the 15 Division and 25 Cavalry the tank unit which in the words of Indians stopped them acted on orders of its commanding officer alone and 1 Corps Headquarter had little idea of what 25 Cavalry did in stopping the Indians till the evening of 8th September.The author has not mentioned 25 Cavalry at all which in words of the Indian Armoured Corps’s historian; was the unit whose " performance was certainly creditable because it alone stood between the Indian 1st Armoured Division and its objective,the MRL Canal 11a" and stopped the 1st Indian Armoured Division on 8th September,all by itself.The authors reproduction of the Indian writer Verghese’s views that the Indian 1st Armoured Division dashed forward rashly is not based on facts.The Indian advance was fairly balanced and it was halted on 8th September not because the Indians had completely committed their armour but because the Commander 1st Armoured Brigade lost his nerve because of false and unsubstantiated reports of his flanks being under counter attack at a time when both the advancing Indian tank regiments had committed a total of only three squadrons with three squadrons uncommitted and the Indian 1st Armoured Division had a third tank regiment totally fresh and in a position to easily outflank the Pakistani armour in Gadgor area12.The author has also not discussed at all the Indian armours total lack of activity on 9th and 10th September.This inactivity at a time when there was just one tank regiment to oppose five Indian tank regiments was the main reason for the Indian main attack’s failure in Sialkot Sector.The treatment of the 1971 war is far more detailed than 1965 war.All the emphasis is however on the Eastern Theatre where the Indian victory in words of the Indian Chief was a foregone conclusion.The author has highlighted actions of bravery at small unit level and has shown that the Pakistan Army put up a good show in East Pakistan as far as the junior leadership was concerned.The battles on the Western Theatre have however been largely ignored and the battle of Chhamb which was described by the Indians as "the most serious reverse suffered in the 1971 war 13" has not been discussed in much detail.Major General Eftikhar was the finest commander at the operational level as far as the Pakistan Army is conerned and any history of Pakistan Army is incomplete without discussing Eftikhar’s brilliant opearational leadership in Chhamb.Eftikhar was one of the only two Pakistani senior commanders praised by the Indian military historians.One Indian military historian described him as one who "showed skill and determination in carrying out his mission" .14
The analysis of the Bhutto period is quite comprehensive and the personality of Mr Bhutto and his attitude towards the army has been described quite correctly.The sycophantic persoanlity of Zia has however been given a generous treatment and many of Zia’s well known antics to please Mr Bhutto like orders to all officers of Multan Garrison to line up their wives to greet Mr Bhutto’s cavalcade passing through the Fort Colony have not been discussed at all.The intelligence and operational failure in Siachen on part of the ISI and the formation responsible for the defence of Siachen as a result of which the Indians were able to infiltrate 35 miles inside Pakistani territory have not been discussed at all.On the contary General Pirdad who was the formation commander during the Siachen debacle has been praised as an admirable officer15.The authors assertion that English language was neglected during the Zia era is not based on facts.I was a cadet in Zia’s tenure at the Pakistan Military Academy.Any cadet who failed in English was not promoted to the next term and English teaching and examination standards were very tough.The crux of the problem was the overall deteriorating English standards in Pakistan following Bhuttos nationalisation of educational institutuins and the relatively poor material joining the army in the post 1971 era.The post Zia era has been covered in a very incisive manner.The authors assertion that the "Director infantry" was a post that any infantry officerw ould welcome is incorrect.Mahor General Zahir Ul Islam Abbasi was posted as Director Infantry following a diasastorous Charge of the light Brigade type attack in Siachen which he had ordered without prior approval of his next senior operational headquarter. in which one of the Pakistani units suffered unnecesarily high casualties including the death of a brigade commander.The authors criticism of the ISI is forthright,accurate and thought provoking.In this regard he has shown courage in criticising a top heavy agency whose much trumpeted reputaion is not matched by actual on ground performance and which suffers from a tendency to embark on private wars.
Brian Cloughley has done a remarkable job in writing a fairly critical history of the Pakistan Army.Most of the factual errors were avoidable but something which should have been taken care of by the publishers who knew that the author was a foreigner and did not have the time to cross check or recheck all the facts because of not permanently residing in Pakistan.The author appears to be too much of a gentleman to critically analyse many of the Quixotic blunders of Indo Pak military history. Nevertheless Brian Cloughley’s book has filled a void in Indo Pak military history by at least constructing a continuous and fairly comprehensive picture of one of third worlds important armies.Regardless of the fact whether any one may agree or disagree with Cloghley’s analysios.the book by and large retains the position of a book which is compulsory for any layman or foreigner doing research on the Pakistan Army.The best defense of a country lies in its national motivation and continuous process of indoctrination aimed at stimulating our people to develop and strengthen faith and confidence in ourselves, and to stand up to any challenge and threat to security of our ideological and geographical borders. All of us in our own different ways are in fact involved in the defence of the country. The farmer or the office hand, the WAPDA lineman or the foundry worker, the professional of one category or another, even the artist, poet or writer who provides intellectual stimulation or aesthetic enjoyment, are all participants in the effort. But the gentlemen in uniform do in the longer view seem to be an endangered species. They lay their life in the sacred cause of defending their country so it becomes a moral duty of the entire nation to look after their siblings and other family members. Pakistan Armed Forces have developed their own system of welfare to help them into a befitting manner.The relentless services of Pakistan Armed Forces to the nation at the time of natural disasters are very well known and recognized by the nation. The latest example in this regard is the response of Pakistan Armed Forces to the earthquake of Oct 2005. Despite having their own bunkers destroyed and casualties suffered, they stood firm against the disaster with courage and determination driven by the will to serve the nation and faced the onslaught of the earthquake bravely. Within short span of two years ERRA, with the assistance of civilian sector under the umbrella of Pakistan Armed Forces, acted upon the policy of "build back better" successfully in steering the society towards the socio – economic stability. As a matter of fact Pakistan Armed Forces have devised regular and continuous systems to help the needees and people in trouble. Pakistan Armed Forces are not only the defenders of the motherland and guardians of the frontiers; they play a vital role in development of Pakistan. The development arena includes socio-economic and cultural sectors. Pakistan Armed forces have a very well organized welfare system. These welfare organizations like FWO, AWT, NLC, SCO, Fauji Foundation, Shaheen Foundation and Bahria Foundation are not only serving for the retired/serving officers and Jawans, and the families of martyrs and disabled but also provide their services for the entire countrymen like provision of jobs and services to a major number of civilians. The other welfare measures include relief and rehabilitation of the effectees of natural catastrophes, establishment of educational institutes, provision of medical assistance, slides clearance, construction of roads, dams, bridges and many more services.The most appreciable thing for the Armed Forces is that soon after the creation of Pakistan; Pakistan Armed Forces reorganized themselves and paid attention to generate funds and resources for themselves through their corporate organizations and self-financing mechanism. Pakistan Armed Forces have completed a number of development projects to generate funds in order to paddle their own canoe.There is no denying the fact that the Indian leadership never reconciled with the existence of Pakistan . They opposed its creation tooth and nail on one pretext or the other but they were unable to frustrate the strategy of Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah. After the creation of Pakistan , the Indians have made continuous and concerted efforts to annihilate Pakistan . They have succeeded in seceding East Pakistan from us. The wars between India and Pakistan have been the wars between two ideologies though the apparent causes have been different. The Indian government’s persistent refusal to pay heed to the world opinion on the question of Kashmir has been another major root cause of confrontation between the two countries. The performance of Pakistan Army in the Indo-Pak Wars has been extremely commendable. A few glimpses in the paragraphs that follow.By November 1947 Auchinleck, Supreme Commander based in New Delhi, being convinced that Indian Cabinet was seeking to destroy and undo Pakistan by economic and military means, was forced to resign. As the build-up of Indian forces in Jammu and Kashmir continued, Pakistan Army units were being hurriedly organized and equipped without any base for manufacture of ammunition, signal stores, equipment or vehicles. Simultaneously, Pakistan National Guards were raised from ex-servicemen and other volunteers along border areas to provide a second line of defence. By February 1948 Indian build up in Jammu and Kashmir reached five brigades plus, under two full-fledged division Headquarters. Our 101 Brigade, commanded by Brigadier Akbar Khan was rushed into the critical front to forestall and halt the Indian offensive along Uri-Muzaffarabad axis. In April 1948, Commander-in-Chief Pakistan Army appreciating the threats in the north along Muzaffarabad-Kohala axis, and in the south along Bhimber-Mirpur-Poonch axis further reinforced the front with elements of 7 Division to halt the Indian offensive at Chakothi. Reinforcements were rushed overnight to Tithwal sector to defend Muzaffarabad front 9(F) Division was also moved to reinforce 7 Division in Tithwal, Uri and Bagh sectors. 7 Division was thereafter moved to the southern front. In May Pakistan informed the United Nations of these moves. By June, Pakistan had five brigades in Jammu and Kashmir together with Azad Kashmir forces and elements of the para-military Frontier Corps, holding twelve Indian brigades (with 4 to 5 battalions each) supported by armour, artillery and Indian Air Force. Indian summer offensive was decisively beaten and halted. Some months later, two brigades of 8 Division from Quetta further reinforced Muzaffarabad-Uri front.On 14 August 1948, the first anniversary of Pakistan , General Headquarters sent the following message to the Quaid-e-Azam, “Loyal and grateful greetings from the Army on the first anniversary of Independence Day. We serve and shall serve Pakistan with all our hearts and souls. Pakistan and its Creator, Zindabad.” The Quaid-e-Azam was at that time in Quetta, fighting his own battle for survival against a deadly affliction. In December, Pakistan Army planned to go on the offensive, ‘Operation Venus’, with 7 Division to cut off the main supply route at Beri Pattan Bridge area, and isolate Indian forces in Nowshera-Jhangar-Poonch sector. On 14 December, in a pre-attack artillery bombardment the Beri Pattan bridge area containing ammunition, rations, petrol and supplies in a two-mile area was totally destroyed together with Indian divisional Headquarter, isolating the Indian forces in that sector. The Indian Army was taken by surprise. At midnight on 30 December, India asked for ceasefire with effect from 1 January 1949. Pakistan accepted, as the fate of Jammu and Kashmir had been taken over by the United Nations. By early 1949 Pakistan Army had completed its formative stage. It halted the Indian offensive and prevented it from totally over-running Jammu and Kashmir, and closing up to Pakistan ’s vital border areas, thus ended the war in Jammu and Kashmir. Pakistan Army continued its reorganization. An ordnance factory to produce small arms and ammunition was established at Wah. The threat from India was by no means over. In spring of 1950 and again between July and October 1951 the Indian Army concentrated on Pakistan‘s borders and transgressed into Azad Kashmir and West Pakistan territory forty eight times. The Indian Air Force violated Pakistan ’s air space thirty times thus bringing the two countries very close to another all out war through India ’s coercive diplomacy and interventionist strategy.The Indian forces intruded into Pakistani area in the Rann of Kutch in April 1965. In a sharp and short conflict, the Indian forces were ejected. Both the armies had fully mobilized, with eyeball to eyeball contact. Pakistan proposed cease-fire, India accepted. An agreement was signed: the forces disengaged. The Award by the Arbitration Tribunal vindicated Pakistan ’s Position.Past midnight on 5/6 September, without a formal declaration of war, Indian Army crossed the international border and attacked Lahore and Kasur fronts. Pakistan Army and Pakistan Air Force halted the attack in its tracks, inflicting heavy casualties on the aggressor. On 7 September a single Pakistan Air Force Pilot, Squadron Leader M.M. Alam, Sitara-i-Juraat, in his F-86 Sabre shot down five Indian Air Force attacking Hunter aircraft in a single sortie, an unbeaten world record “On night 6/7 September three teams of our Special Services Groups were para-dropped on Indian Air Force bases at Pathankot, Adampur and Halwara to neutralize them.To relieve pressure on Lahore front, on night 7/8 September, after crossing two major water obstacles in a bold thrust, Pakistani armoured and mechanized formations supported by artillery and Pakistan Air Force overran area Khem Karn, 6 to 8 miles inside Indian territory. Vital Indian positions at Sulemanki and across Rajasthan and Sindh were also captured in bold, swift attacks.On night 7/8 September, 1 Corps of Indian Army launched its main effort east of Sialkot with one armoured and three infantry divisions on our extended 15 Division front, screened only by gallant 3 Frontier Force and B Company 13 Frontier Force (Reconnaissance & Support). 24 Infantry Brigade (Brigadier A.A Malik, Hilal-i-Juraat) on the move in area Pasrur, rushed 25 Cavalry (Lieutenant Colonel Nisar Ahmad, Sitara-i-Juraat), on 8 September to delay and disrupt enemy thrusts. As soon as the presence of Indian 1 Armoured Division was confirmed, Pakistan Army rushed forward to stop the onslaught on a 30-mile front. The biggest tank battle since World War II was fought on the Chwinda front by 6 Armoured Division with under command 24 Infantry Brigade Groups and valiantly supported by 4 Corps Artillery (Brigadier A.A.K. Choudhry, Hilal-i-Juraat). The main effort of the Indian Army was blunted, inflicting heavy and troop casualties. Pakistan Air Force support helped turn the tide of the battle. Before a counter offensive by 6 Armoured Division on 22 September could be launched, Indian asked for cease-fire in the United Nations. India ’s aggression against our international borders without a formal declaration of war had cost it, apart from heavy personnel, material land economic losses, 1617 sq. miles of territory as compared to 446 sq. miles of our open and undefended territory. Pakistan Army captured 20 officers, 19 Junior Commissioned Officers, and 569 Other Ranks.
With 1971 commenced the most tragic year of our history. Failing to resolve a political problem by political means, a Martial Law regime, manipulated by some megalomaniac politicians, resorted to military action in East Pakistan on night 25/26 March. Widespread insurgency broke out. Personnel of two infantry divisions and Civil Armed Forces with weapons were airlifted in Pakistan International Airlines planes, over-flying about 5000 miles non stop via Sri Lanka in the first week of April 1971 – the longest operational air move by Pakistan Army. By May near normalcy had been restored, thanks to the fast reaction, dedication and cool courage of our soldiers, sailors and airmen operating in a hostile environment under adverse climatic and terrain conditions, without adequate logistic or medical support. India’s immoral covert armed intervention having failed, by October it had concentrated four times our strength in over 12 divisions (400,000) supported by five regiments of tanks, and about 50,000 activists trained and equipped by Indian Army. Indian Navy’s one aircraft carrier, eight destroyers/frigates, two submarines and three landing craft, against our four gunboats, eight Chinese coasters and two landing craft supported them. Eleven Indian Air Force squadrons – 4 Hunter, 1 SU-7, 3 Gnat and 3 MiG 21 – from five airfields around East Pakistan faced our one valiant Number 14 squadron of F-86F Sabres based on a single airfield around Dhaka.On 21 November, Eid day, when our fatigued soldiers had been operating in the most hostile environment for almost ten months, including a month of fasting, the Indian army felt emboldened enough to launch a full scale invasion at over twenty fronts in the east, west and north of East Pakistan. Divisions attacked our brigade positions; brigades attacked our battalion, company and platoon positions, supported by their armour, artillery and lair force. When most of our defensive positions, rooted to the ground, could not be overrun, Indian forces after suffering heavy casualties resorted to outflanking moves. The aggressors could not capture, till the cease-fire; on 16 December, a single town except Jessore, which was not defended for strategic reasons. For the Pakistani soldiers this was their finest hour, fighting against heavy odds with their backs to the wall inflicting heavy casualties, bloodied but unbowed” when an Indian commander, through a messenger asked for our Jamalpur battalion to surrender, encircled by two brigades, the commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel Sultan Ahmad, Sitara-i-Juraat of 31 Baloch replied kin a message wrapped around a bullet which read, “I want to tell you that the fighting you have seen so far is very little; in fact the fighting has not even started. So let us stop negotiating and start the fight.” Similarly 4 Frontier Force under 205 Brigade (Brigadier Tajammul Malik) held out at Hilli for l19 days against 6 battalions, inflicting heavy casualties, till withdrawn on 11 December, after getting outflanked. Similar hard fought actions took place at Bahaduria and elsewhere by Punjab, Baloch, Frontier Force and Azad Kashmir units all arms and services, and Civil Armed Forces including West Pakistan Rangers and police units. 107 Brigades (Brigadier Mohammad Hayat, Sitara-i-Juraat) held at bay a division of 5 brigades and 2 armour regiments at Khulna inflicting heavy casualties till 17 December and ceased fighting only after repeated orders of our Eastern Command. On the West Pakistan front, on 3 December 1971, India attacked with the main effort against Shakargarh sector with three infantry divisions supported by three armoured brigades against our 8 Division front, operating under our 1 Corps (Commander Lieutenant General Irshad Ahmad Khan). The attack was halted in the tracks, inflicting heavy casualties. 8 (Independent) Armoured Brigade (Brigadier Mohammad Ahmed, Sitara-i-Juraat) effectively blocked and destroyed enemy penetration our minefield and saved Zafarwal from being outflanked by enemy armour. In Jammu and Kashmir, Chhamb, Lahore, Kasur, Sulemanki and Rajasthan sectors, war was carried into Indian territory, with success at some points, not so successfully at others due to inadequate forces and air support. For the Pakistan Army, Navy and Air Force this conflict was their finest hour. Fighting against overwhelming odds in both wings of the country raged with full fury. Before our counter offensive could be launched in West Pakistan, India asked for cease-fire in the United Nations. The Ghazis and Shaheeds proved in their supreme hour of trial all the military virtues of Faith, Honour, Valour, Fortitude, Endurance, Loyalty, Group Cohesion and Unlimited Liability, and above all, the spirit of Jehad. On 4 December 1971, the United States moved a draft resolution calling for cease-fire and withdrawal of Indian forces, which was vetoed by United States of Southern Russia. Thereafter, another six resolutions including one by China were introduced calling for cease-fire and withdrawal of forces, some of which were accepted by Pakistan authorities. However, due to behind the scene political machinations by India and her allies their passage and implementation was stalled till Dhaka fell on 16 December 1971 and the cease-fire had been perfidiously converted to surrender.” I took a careful look at the documents and was aghast to see the heading – which read Instrument of ‘Surrender’……” writes Lieutenant General J.F.R.Jacob, Chief of Staff, Indian, Eastern Army. (Lieutenant General J.F.R.Jacob, “Surrender at Dacca: Birth of a Nation).Flawed national and operational strategy proved to; be disastrous for Pakistan , both politically and militarily. Power, national and operational strategy, the methodology of crisis and conflict management, and higher direction of war in which we had been found wanting in 1971.
Best WordPress SEO Plugins
Best WordPress SEO Plugins
Search engines are a major source of traffic for most websites. That’s why our users often ask us for SEO tips and plugins that can help improve SEO of their WordPress sites. In this article, we will share 9 best WordPress SEO plugins and tools that will improve SEO of your website.1. WordPress SEO by Yoast
It is one of the most downloaded WordPress plugin of all times. Yoast’s WordPress SEO is a comprehensive solution for all your on-site SEO needs.
It allows you to add SEO title, meta description, and meta keywords to each post and page of your site.
You can also write custom title for your main site, archives, category and tag pages. It also adds Open Graph meta data, Twitter Cards, Sitemaps and ping search engines whenever you update your site.
The list of features for WordPress SEO is extremely long. Check out why we use WordPress SEO on WPBeginner and all our websites. After that, head over to learn how to install and setup WordPress SEO plugin.
2. SEMrush
SEMRush is a tool that Pros use to gather analytics and insights from their competitor’s to help improve their own SEO.You can learn about organic keywords to rank for, places where you can get backlinks from, insights into your competitor’s advertising strategies, and so much more.SEMrush is a paid subscription and is used by thousands of SEO professionals all over the world. It can provide you an enormous wealth of data.
3. Google Keyword Planner
No one on the planet has more insights into what people are searching for than the search giant Google.Did you know that you can get your own keyword ideas from Google itself by using the Google Keyword Planner tool.This free tool is offered to Google’s advertisers for free and anyone can use it. It’s main purpose is to show advertisers the keywords they can bid on for their advertising campaigns. It also helps advertisers choose right keywords by showing them an estimate of search volume, number of results, and difficulty level.As a content marketer or blogger, you can use this data to find keywords with high search volume, high advertiser interest, and more importantly keywords where you can easily outrank all other sites.
4. KeywordTool.io
Keyword Tool is one of the best free keyword research tool available right now. It allows you to simply generate keyword ideas by typing in a keyword. These keyword suggestions are gathered from Google’s auto suggest feature.These keyword suggestions are a treasure of information. Google autocomplete suggest keywords based on how often a keyword is used for the search. This means that the top most results are the most frequently searched terms on Google for that particular keyword.Keyword Tool is amazingly fast, and most importantly it is completely free for anyone to use. You can use it to optimize content on your WordPress site. It also allows you to get keyword suggestions from YouTube, Bing, and App Store as well.
5. Open Site Explorer
Developed by Moz, this free tool allows you to check data for any domain name. You can see who is linking to that domain and what anchor texts they are using. Apart from that, Open Site Explorer offers a wealth of information like top pages, linking domains, which pages are linked on your site, etc.This tool is free, but has daily search limits for each person.To unlock the full power, you would need a Moz Pro Subscription which also gets you access to their other tools as well.
6. LinkPatrol
LinkPatrol is a premium WordPress plugin which allows you to control all the links on your website.
You can monitor all the outgoing links on your site, find out which links are giving away link juice, and more.LinkPatrol is less resource intensive than other free plugins that do the same job. It provides a quicker and efficient way to clean up all your anchor text, spammy links, and link juice problems with a very intuitive and super fast user interface.
7. Broken Link Checker
Broken links can not only create bad experience for your users, but they can also affect your site’s SEO. If you have been running a blog for sometime, then you should check your site from time to time for broken links and fix them.Broken Link Checker is a free WordPress plugin that allows you to find broken links on your WordPress site. You can then fix those links without even editing your posts. See our tutorial on how to fix broken links in WordPress with Broken Link Checker.It is a highly useful plugin, and its totally free. The only downside is that it can become resource intensive and may slow down your server. Some hosting providers like WPEngine has already blocked this plugin on their servers.
8. Rel NoFollow Checkbox
When you link to an external site, you are giving away some of your site’s authority to that link. If you don’t want do that, then you can add a nofollow attribute to that link.
In fact, you can even make all external links nofollow in WordPress. But this might not be a great idea. Sometime you may want to give a dofollow link to truly helpful sites.Rel NoFollow Checkbox is a simple WordPress plugin which adds a checkbox in the insert link popup of WordPress post editor. This popup already has a check box which allows you to open links in new tab. Now whenever you are adding an external link you can easily make it nofollow by simply checking a box.
9. SEOquake
SEOquake is a SEO tool available as browser addon for Google Chrome, Mozilla Firefox, Opera, and Safari web browsers. It provides SEO related information for any website. These information parameters include page rank, age, last updated, alexa rank, and many other parameters. It is one of the most downloaded browser addon by SEO professionals.Apart from that, SEOquake toolbar can show you all these parameters for all the search results. This information can be extremely useful if you are gauging competition for different keywords. You can even download search results in CSV format and prepare your own excel sheets of search data.
Bonus SEO Tips for WordPress Site Owners
Site speed is one of the many important factors in search rankings. Fast loading sites can easily outrank slower websites. While you are spending a lot of time improving your content strategy, give some of that time to improve your site speed.Make sure your WordPress site loads fast. You can check your site speed on tools like Google Page Speed and Pingdom.Always install and setup a caching plugin on your WordPress site. We recommend using W3 Total Cache or WP Super Cache. To give your site speed even more boost, you can set up a CDN service to work with your caching plugin. At WPBeginner and on all our websites, we use MaxCDN. It greatly improves our page load times.You should also upload optimized images only. Images can affect your site’s speed and by optimizing them you can significantly improve your sites performance.Lastly, if none of these tips are improving your page speed, then its most likely your web host’s fault. You need to move to a better WordPress hosting provider. We recommend using Siteground because they have fully optimized servers to run WordPress sites. If you want managed WordPress hosting, then we recommend either Pagely or WPEngine.
SEO In Pakistan
SEO In Pakistan
Search Engine Optimization in 2015 is too complex for beginners so they must need to follow some Best SEO Tips and Tricks that will boost their Website ranking better in modern Search Engines.So here we are going to see some Basic and Intermediate SEO Tips and Tricks that helps to improve your 3 important website ranking and also in Search Engine Results Page.Below SEO tips and techniques are provided as per Google Best Practices and this cover most of the onpage factors.
Tips and Techniques for Keyword Analysis
The Below list will help to improve the Keyword Analysis better.
- Use this Google Keyword Planner for Keyword research
- Find Less Competitive Keywords with high search Volume
- Choose Key phrases
- List out Relative Keywords by relevance
Google Keyword Planner - Google Keyword Planner is the free SEO tool that is provided by Google and it helps to find out the Keywords search volume and relative Keyword ideas for you. Useful tool compare with other keyword analysis tool because Google is the top Search Engine used by people so it's worth to use this tool. Also use this 8 Free Google SEO Tools that help to Optimize your website
Less Competitive Keyword with high Search Volume - Finding this one is crucial part of SEO because if you find out this Keyword then you can get high search visitors. More competitor's means ranking high is also too much tough. So find out less completive Keywords.
Choose Key Phrases - Rather than selecting a single Keyword it's better chance to ranking more than one keyword if you chosen Key Phrases. So select Key phrases that works better compare to keywords.
List out Relative Keywords by relevance - List the relevant Searches and Keywords and use the words or phrase in the article going to publish in the blog for the selected keyword. This is going to help get ranking in more phrases than you targeted.
Excellent SEO Tips to improve On-Page optimization
Use this free top 10 wordpress SEO Plugins for better on-page seo for Wordpress blogs.
- Interesting and Descriptive to read
- Quality of the Content
- Short and Sweet Title
- Relative Meta Description
- Use this Optimal Keyword Density Ratio in content
- SEO Friendly Url
- Keywords in First Paragraph
- Use of Headings
- Focusing Keywords
- Image Optimization
Interesting and Descriptive article - No one is going to like boring long articles so write your content interest to read and descriptive content that will clear all things about the article title.
Quality of the Content - Don't copy Paste whole content from the other website that never going to bring you traffic. Google has very good eye to find out the Duplicate contents. Avoid Keyword stuffing and other Black-hat SEO tricks.
Shot and Sweet Title - Title must be relative and the Key phrase Keywords must be present in the Title. And in length is better to keep it between 40 to 65 Characters. To make website title tag to more search engine friendly read this Tips to optimize the title tag .
Relative Meta Description - Writ a short and sweet 156 Characters that will explain your whole story of the article will help to know better in Search Engines Results Page.
Optimal Keyword Density Ratio - Maintain your Keyword Density in the Safe manner to not getting Google Algorithm Penalties.
SEO Friendly URL - Url of the content must be meaning full to the content. Then search Engine highlight the Url Keywords also it's a boosting signal for the SEO.
Keyword in First Paragraph - Use the Keywords in First Paragraph so search Engines know this is the content really explains about the Title.
Use of Headings - Use prober headings tags h1, h2, etc... It will make readability easier and Nice Chapter wise content.
Focusing Keywords - Highlighting the Keyword with strong or em tag will increase the visibility of the point you are really want to reader by people also it's add some weight in SEO.
Image Optimization - One Image can explain everything better than long story content so add an image and Optimize image using proper Alt Tags.
Tips to improve Off-Page SEO
- Use of Social Media
- Quality Link Building
Use of Social Media - Use of Social Media not going to build follow back links but it's a powerful source to deliver traffic to the website. Traffic signal is also important factor in SEO so use the social media to get traffic.
Quality Link Building - Don't build your Link too much faster. Quantity of Back links that's not matter Quality will Matter. So write your articles good and interesting then the Back link will flow automatically to your content.
Useful SEO Tricks for 2015
- Find LSI Keywords
- Use LSI Keywords more
- SEO Check Up
Find LSI Keywords - Find the Latent Semantic Indexing Keywords related to your keywords using different methods available in the internet.
Use LSI Keywords more - Rather than Keyword stuffing the new idea use mixes it up LSI Keywords with Keywords as Keyword Stuffing. Use it in all important On-Page SEO Factors.
SEO Check Up - Take SEO Check Up and using different tools available in the Internet and improve the SEO Score by fixing by the tips then you can get a better rank in SERP.Add a Bookmark of this Page above Tricks will be updated in regular manner to maintain the Quality of the Article.
Necessaries of SEO Tips and Tricks in 2015
Competitive world everything will have some Guidelines and rules that must we need to follow. So we need to follow this techniques to survive our ranking in search Engines.Always one thing we need to remember in SEO that is if we write Unique and Good Articles that is interest to read for a user not for search engines this is the one rule always survives you in SERP.Hope this SEO Tips and Tricks will helps to boost your rank in Google in 2015.
Wedding
Wedding
Wedding venue couple The average cost of a wedding in the United States is well over $20,000. But if you’re planning your big day, don’t let that number scare you! There are plenty of creative methods to implement budget wedding ideas without sacrificing what matters most to you.
One of the best ways to save is with your wedding venue. A wedding venue could be many things, but for most weddings, it means a place for the ceremony and a place for the reception. Planning the wedding venue is really the first step in planning a wedding – everything else hinges on the location.
So start off your wedding planning right by making the most cost-effective decision. Here are 16 ways to do just that.
Wedding Venues on a Budget
1. Don’t Get Married on a Saturday
You are probably not surprised that Saturday is the most common day to get married. It’s convenient, it’s traditional, and it’s what most people are used to. And because it’s the most common day, it’s also the most expensive. Many venues will charge up to 50% less if you book their location for a Sunday or Friday. Why? Because they typically don’t get weddings for those days, it’s like extra income for them and everybody wins.
2. Focus on Priorities
What is the main thing that you want out of your wedding venues? Is it a really great view, with less emphasis placed on the food? Or do you want a 5-star sprawl of gourmet delights, without regard to whether or not the location is in the center of a bustling city? Figure out what’s most important to you and splurge a little on that one thing (e.g. a well-known chef or a picturesque setting) and save on your budget with the stuff that doesn’t matter as much.
3. Consider Non-Traditional Venues
Get creative. Consider a bed & breakfast, a public park, or an art gallery for your reception. Places that don’t typically host weddings may not have the same exorbitant prices as those that are well-known for being wedding venues.
4. Go Small Town Instead of Big City
Prices are usually higher in big cities so go outside the city limits to get better deals. I had a friend who lived in Atlanta, and chose to get married in Newnan, a suburb about 45 minutes outside of Atlanta. She saved about $10,000 compared to the price quotes she was getting in the city.
5. Choose One Venue Instead of Two
Many locations have the ability to be both a ceremony and reception venue, which means you don’t have to pay two separate location fees. For example, many churches have a hall that is available for such occasions. A few years ago, I went to a beautiful wedding at a retreat house in the mountains that served as both a ceremony and reception site. Tip: Guests love when they do not have to drive from the ceremony to get to the reception!
6. Have a Morning Wedding
Although it may be tricky for a bride to get herself ready bright and early, having a morning wedding can save a lot of money. Serving brunch or lunch at the reception is much cheaper than serving a dinner. Plus, you will have more time to spend with your new spouse on your actual wedding day.
7. Use Your Negotiation Skills
Try to get offers from many different locations and use that information to your advantage. Also, make sure you don’t mention that you want the venue for a wedding until after you get quoted a price for the party. Some locations will jack up the price when they hear the word “wedding.”
8. Ask to Pay in Full for a Discount
Typically, you are required to provide a down payment when you book a venue for a wedding and then pay the rest later. Ask if you can get a discount if you pay in full when you book (but make sure you get a contract with a reimbursement plan to protect yourself in the event that something goes wrong).
9. Get Married Off-Season
Summer is wedding season. Although it may be more convenient for families with children to attend the wedding during the summer when the weather is nice and sunny, consider an off-season month, such as November or January, to cut your costs. This will also save you money when you book your honeymoon.
10. Have a Small Reception and a Party Later
If you keep your wedding and reception to about 50 people or less, you can save a lot of money. Invite close friends and family and then when you get back from your honeymoon, throw a casual (and inexpensive) party to celebrate with the rest of your friends.
11. Get an All-Inclusive Package
While my husband and I did opt for a traditional ceremony in a church, I got an all-inclusive package at my wedding reception site. They took care of everything, including the decorations, food, and cake. This saved us a ton because the venue made deals with various services and then passed the savings on to us.
12. Get Married in Your Backyard
There are definite pros and cons to this option. If you’re up for something casual for your reception, like a backyard BBQ, this is a great option. If you want a more formal affair, you will probably end up spending more money, because you have to rent everything (i.e. tables, flatware, servers, etc.). Do some research to see if this is a money-saving option for you.
13. Shorten the Reception
Some venues will charge you by the hour. To shave off some cost, consider shortening the reception by one hour. Many guests won’t even notice since they leave receptions early. This will also save you money in other areas, such as with the photographer, videographer, DJ, or band.
14. Don’t Over-rent Space
Make sure that the space you rent is appropriate for the number of guests that you will have. Do not even look at venues that accommodate 300 guests when you will only expect 100.
15. Find Somewhere New
Another one of my tactics in saving money on my own wedding was to use a newly-opened venue. New venues might offer lower prices as they are attempting to build up a good reputation and gain some new business.
16. B.Y.O.B.
If you’re serving alcohol at your wedding, choose a place that allows you to bring in your own liquor, wine, and beer. This is where most venues really jack up the prices to make money off of receptions. You can save hundreds of dollars by bringing your own spirits for the party.
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